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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines variations in the development of cooperative businesses across 
member states in the European Union to identify and explain patterns in cooperative 
participation. Through a comparative analysis of statistical indicators coupled with 
regional analyses of historical determinants that may have incentivized cooperative 
participation, the current state of cooperatives in each region is highlighted and the 
relevance of each cooperative development indicator is discussed.  This thesis uses 
literature on the early European cooperative movement, the development of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and the current state of cooperative agricultural 
production to present a historically contextualized look at the European model of 
agricultural production and to highlight the patterns in cooperative development across 
regional groupings. The findings show that there is a strong association between 
regional groupings and average members per agricultural producers’ cooperative (APC) 
and a moderate association between average agricultural output and average members 
per APC. When knowledge of region and average agricultural output is present, there 
are reductions in error in predicting average members per APC. The findings indicate 
that cooperative development expectations among the different regional groupings 
might be changing as regions succeed in unexpected ways. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 What is a Cooperative?  
 Cooperative organizations are not new inventions in regards to their structure and 
principles, however their presence amidst the post-industrial landscape of the 21st century 
can be seen as a quiet protest against conventional individual and corporate means of 
ownership and production. Cooperatives provide an alternative business model that has the 
capacity to compete against traditional and investor-owned businesses through cooperative 
participation and marketing. The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) defines a 
cooperative as “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise” (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 24). Building on this definition, 
the Canadian Co-operative Association defined cooperatives as “business organizations 
owned by the members who use their services” (Fairbairn, 2004, p. 25). The definition of 
what a cooperative is remains contested due to differences in ownership (producer, worker, 
or consumer) and purpose (credit, housing, grocery, etc.) but these three principles 
underscore the importance of democracy and autonomy in all cooperative organizations 
(Bijman et al., 2012): 
1. The User-Owner Principle:  
• Those who own and finance the cooperative are those who use the cooperative.   
2. The User-Control Principle:  
• Those who control the cooperative are those who use the cooperative.   
3. The User-Benefits Principle:  
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• The cooperative’s sole purpose is to provide and distribute benefits to its users on 
the basis of their use. 
The qualifications and requirements that structure how a cooperative is legally 
defined vary from country to country depending on the specific sector and whether the 
government wants to incentivize or discourage cooperative participation (Bijman & 
Iliopoulos, 2014). While cooperatives can be organised for a variety of purposes, this thesis 
focuses specifically on agricultural producers’ cooperatives (APCs). APCs are 
organizations that unite agricultural producers under a common business which is them 
used to aggregate, market, and sell the agricultural goods of member farmers. The benefits 
of participating in an APC include the ability to share risk, achieve economies of scale, 
lower transaction costs, gain competitive advantage, and more easily access resources 
(Bijman et al., 2012). When APCs are referenced in this thesis, the term includes not only 
the legally recognized and financially supported producer organizations (POs) in the 
European Union (EU) but it also includes the agricultural cooperatives that belong to 
sectors that are not yet financially supported by the EU. 
 
1.2 The Economic Advantages of Cooperation 
 According to a landmark study in 2012 meant to garner support for cooperatives in 
the EU, the economic benefits of APCs are worthy of EU support through pro-APC 
policies, public support through the purchasing of products produced by APCs, and farmer 
support through becoming a member of an APC (Bijman et al., 2012). In 2010, dairy APCs 
in the EU reached a 57% market share while APCs from all agricultural product sectors 
reached a 40% market share across the EU (Bijman et al., 2012). In some sectors, there is 
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evidence that APCs can provide increases in profits to both members and nonmember 
producers and that APCs can achieve a higher market share in relation to investor-owned 
businesses (Bijman et al., 2012). The Competitive Yardstick Theory claims that the 
presence of cooperatives in an agricultural sector improves competition which in turn 
provides benefits such as higher prices to both producers who are members of cooperatives 
and to producers who are not (Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014). However, APCs enjoy varying 
levels of success depending on which agricultural sector they are operating. A study by 
Hanisch et al. (2013) suggests that in countries where dairy cooperatives have a higher 
market share than dairy cooperatives in other countries, higher market shares are 
accompanied by higher prices (Hanisch et al., 2013). This study supports the Competitive 
Yardstick Theory and lends credence to the ability of APCs in certain sectors to bring both 
members and nonmembers higher prices for their goods (Hanisch et al., 2013). 
The recognition of the economic benefits of APCs by the European Commission 
(EC) led it to commission a study in 2010 entitled “Support for Farmers’ Cooperatives” 
which provided both policy makers and producers with a resource guide that outlined the 
benefits, the barriers, and the state of increased cooperative agricultural participation in the 
EU (Bijman et al., 2012). This study set out to describe the overall state of agricultural 
cooperatives in the EU and to identify the laws and regulations that help or hinder farmers 
who produce cooperatively or who would like to produce cooperatively, as well as to “help 
farmers organise themselves in cooperatives as a means to consolidate their market 
orientation and so generate a solid market income” (Bijman et al., 2012, p. 7). 
 However, APCs are less prevalent in many Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs), many of which are considered “transition societies” where socialism and 
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communism negatively impacted the public image of cooperative participation 
(Gijselinckx & Bussels, 2014, p. 517).  Mediterranean and Southern European countries 
face challenges to development of cooperative agricultural sectors such as a lack of access 
to risk capital (Bijman et al., 2012). Barriers to cooperative development call into question 
whether current EU policies foster cooperative participation and are effective across 
regions with different historical and socioeconomic legacies. 
 
1.3 Variation of Cooperative Development in the EU 
Variation in the development of APCs across the EU has been well studied and 
documented with some countries facing specific challenges regarding levels of cooperative 
memberships compared to other countries. Many Northern and Western European 
countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Austria, and Denmark all have a membership intensity, or percentage of producers who are 
members of APC, of over 50% (Gijselinckx & Bussels, 2014). Mediterranean and Southern 
European countries have a membership intensity of around 30% to 50%, while CEECs 
such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, 
Romania, and Bulgaria all have a membership intensity of below 30% and in some cases 
below 10% (Gijselinckx & Bussels, 2014). Concerning the market share of agricultural 
products marketed by way of APCs, the Northern and Western European countries market 
over 40% and in some cases over 50% of agricultural products through cooperatives 
(Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014). Mediterranean and Southern European countries such as 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece market around 25% to 50% of agricultural products 
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through cooperatives, while CEECs fall into the 0% to 25% bracket according to Bijman 
et al. (2012). 
 The propensity of some countries to produce cooperatively more than others can be 
at least partially explained by the political systems and historical legacies that the countries 
in these regional groupings have experienced. No country in Northern and Western Europe 
has experienced a communist regime and no Northern and Western European country falls 
below a membership intensity of 50% or below a 40% market share of cooperatively 
marketed agricultural products (Bijman et al., 2012). This link between both higher 
membership intensity and higher market shares of cooperatively produced agricultural 
goods and countries that have not experienced communism provides insight into the culture 
of wariness towards cooperative institutions that has developed in post-Soviet and post-
Yugoslavic states that does not exist in states without communist legacies. Those countries 
that have experienced communist regimes typically have the lowest membership intensity 
percentages and the lowest percentage of agricultural products markets cooperatively in 
the EU-28. When looking at the literature, CEECs have shown a rapid decline in APC 
membership after the fall of communism and during the privatization of agricultural sectors 
(Gijselinckx & Bussels, 2014). CEECs with traditions of cooperative participation before 
communism have yet to see a full rebound since 1989. 
According to Gijselinckx and Bussels (2014) in “Social and Historical 
Determinants of Cooperative Membership in Agriculture,” although membership rates 
might be low in post-communist CEECs, this could be accounted for by the “propaganda 
of individual success” that national governments used to promote privatization and 
entrepreneurship. Additionally, post-communist CEECs such as Poland and Czech 
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Republic which implemented more liberal forms of communism have levels of 
membership intensity and cooperative marketing of agricultural product ratios that are 
higher than other CEECs (Gijselinckx & Bussels, 2014). Over 80% of Polish farmers 
resisted the collectivization of their farms under communism (De Master, 2012). While 
there were repercussions to resisting collectivization such as severely restricted access to 
petrochemical fertilizers, the ability of a significant percentage of Polish farms to resist 
collectivization without more severe repercussions signals the relative liberality of its 
communist regime (De Master, 2012). This suggests that stricter forms of communism had 
more negative effects on cooperative development than less strict forms. The effects of 
inefficient state-mandated collectivism have made APC membership unappealing to 
producers who lived through the old regimes as well as the transition periods that followed.  
 Lissowska’s study “The deficit of cooperative attitudes and trust in post-transition 
economies” (2012) adds to the “propaganda of individual success” argument by suggesting 
that countries which were making the transition from communism to market economies 
based their transitions off the idea that “self-interested individuals competing in the market 
would provide the best economic results” (Lissowska, 2012, p. 2). Lissowska argues that 
trust and cooperation were not part of the original transition plans 20 years ago and because 
of this, the current state increased trust and cooperation found across the EU is largely 
absent in post-transition countries. Through qualitative research, Lissowska’s study 
indicates that “post-transition societies still constitute a relatively homogenous group and 
are different from the others from the point of view of level of trust and type of social 
engagement,” a conclusion which helps to explain the lesser degree of cooperative 
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development seen in many Central and Eastern European post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavic 
countries (Lissowska, 2012, p. 2). 
In Mediterranean and Southern European countries, the literature linking historical 
and socioeconomic determinants to different measures of cooperative development are 
sparse. However, studies have identified key problems that explain why Mediterranean and 
Southern European countries produce less efficiently through APCs. In the case of Greece, 
government interference in the affairs of cooperatives has made Greek APCs into some of 
the least productive in the EU, with Greek APCs producing less value per APC than in any 
other country (Iliopoulos & Valentinov, 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s, APCs in Greece 
were courted by major political parties to try and gain the support of their leaders and 
members. During this same period, farmers began joining APCs not because of the benefits 
that they provided economically, but because being a member of a cooperative helped 
farmers gain access to politicians. APCs became more effective as political tools than as 
businesses because farmers represented around 20% of the electorate. When global 
competition was increasing and commodity prices began to decrease in the 1990s and 
2000s at the same time as the EU halted its use of direct subsidies to support farms, leaders 
of APCs became increasingly unable to protect the incomes of farmers, a problem which 
was never fully remedied (Iliopoulos & Valentinov, 2012).  
In the case of Spain, Italy, and Portugal in the olive oil sector which have achieved 
national APC market shares of 70%, 5%, and 35% respectively, all three have gradually 
seen their share of the market diminish (Bijman et al., 2012). This could be due to a general 
lack of integration between producers and downstream processing activities such as 
bottling. The federated structure of two-tier cooperative systems used in Spain where “first-
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tier” olive APCs send their olives to “second-tier” APCs which then extract, bottle, and 
brand the oil seems to be more inefficient than other more integrated approaches, though 
Spanish olive oil APCs probably make up for some efficiency by being larger than the 
average APC in other Mediterranean and Southern European countries (Bijman et al., 
2012). The CMO for fruit and vegetables, which provides financial incentives for fruit and 
vegetable POs, has been effective in some Mediterranean and Southern European member 
states, with both Spanish and Italian APCs maintaining around 50% of the fruit and 
vegetable market (Bijman et al., 2012). While some agricultural sectors have seen positive 
growth for APCs, other sectors face difficulties, making it hard to point to specific issues 
that member states collectively face across the board. 
 
1.4 Research Question and Data 
This thesis adds to the literature on variations in cooperative development across 
agricultural sectors by using quantitative indicators of cooperative development to identify 
contemporary patterns in cooperative development between distinct regional groups. This 
thesis focuses specifically on APCs within the EU and the variability of their prevalence 
across different cultural, economic, historical, and political landscapes. While the EU is 
guided by its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its guidance on producer 
organizations, the CAP gives each of the 28 member states of the EU a level of autonomy 
in how they individually define and support APCs and whether they incentivize or 
discourage cooperative participation. This thesis does not seek to undeservingly glorify or 
idealize APCs, but rather it seeks to build on the literature on the past and present state of 
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APCs to understand why farmers some member states produce cooperatively more than 
other member states. 
National policies regarding APCs reflect the unique histories and socioeconomic 
characteristics of each member state. I posit here that the differences and similarities in the 
legacies of regional groupings of member states can help us to better understand variations 
in cooperative participation by contextualizing the current state of participation within the 
legacies of these regional groups. This study is different from others present in the literature 
because of the indicators used to measure levels of cooperative participation. By using 
recent data available for all four cooperative development indicators and analyzing regional 
differences within the context of the historical regional characteristics, this thesis provides 
a path for further studies of cooperative participation in the EU. The overarching research 
question is: What patterns exist regarding the level of participation in agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives across groups of historically and politically contrasting countries 
within the European Union, and how does each group’s economic, historical, and political 
background play into levels of cooperative participation? 
One way to approach the topic of varying levels of cooperative participation in the 
EU would be to look at the evolution of agricultural producer cooperatives over time and 
to link historical statistics to national and EU-level policy decisions which have affected 
cooperative agricultural enterprises and their members. However, the absence of complete 
and comparable historical data on agricultural producer cooperatives makes this kind of 
analysis difficult. Instead, I have utilized a dataset produced by COGECA in 2015 as a part 
of their annual “Development of Agricultural Cooperatives in the EU.” This source 
provides some of the key statistics on agricultural cooperatives for each member state such 
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as number of cooperatives, number of cooperative members, and annual turnover 
(COGECA, 2015). This report provided both EU institutions and member state 
governments with an overview of the state of the EU and the different cooperative 
agricultural sectors in each of its member states. A report by Cooperatives Europe in 2015 
entitled “The Power of Cooperation” was also used to fill in missing data from the 
COGECA report (Cocolina, 2016). The report provides key statistics such as member and 
employee numbers for member states. 
In this thesis, I identify the relevant indicators that provide insight into the current 
state of APCs and their members across three regional groupings of member states with 
similar historical and socioeconomic legacies. These groups are: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom as a “Northern and Western European” group; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as 
a “Central and Eastern European” group; and Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece as a 
“Mediterranean and Southern European” group.  The reasons behind these groupings stem 
from the varying prevalence and institutional structure of cooperatives in different parts of 
the EU as was previously discussed. Cyprus and Malta were not included in country the 
country groupings because neither country was consistently examined in the literature as 
part of any of the three regional groupings. This lack of a regional association could be due 
to the fact that Cyprus and Malta are both island countries and are not geographically 
connected to continental Europe. 
Many Western and Northern European countries have cooperative traditions that 
reach back over 150 years. These countries face challenges concerning the internal 
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governance of large, increasingly international APCs which have been so successful that 
they are outgrowing their legal and structural boundaries (Hagedorn, 2014). In Central and 
Eastern European Countries, the memory of state farms and nationalized lands and the 
“communist legacy” with which they are associated has made farmers skeptical of “forced 
cooperation” and hence more prone to organizing traditional family farm businesses that 
were not members of APCs (Hagedorn, 2014, 557). In Mediterranean European countries, 
while countries such as Spain and Greece have achieved high rates of cooperative 
membership and participation, the problem lies in difficulties with internal governance and 
the level of “trust in political institutions” by producers (Bijman et al., 2012, 89). The great 
success of APCs and POs in Northern and Western Europe is contrasted against the 
difficulties that many CEECs and Mediterranean and Southern European member states 
have had when developing cooperative enterprises.  
Through an analysis of each group of countries and the different cooperative 
development indicators of APC members per capita, APCs per capita, average members 
per APC, and total agricultural output, this thesis seeks to identify patterns in cooperative 
development for each group of countries and outline arguments for how these patterns fit 
into the political and historical legacies of each group. For all instances where “per capita” 
is used in the context of these cooperative development indicators, the measure is per 
100,000 people. APC members per capita was used as a cooperative development indicator 
because it provides information on how many producers per 100,000 people are in each 
member state or region. This knowledge is useful for comparing the number of APC 
members and non-members between regional groupings and member states. By that same 
logic, the APCs per capita and average membership per APC indicators are useful for 
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comparing densities of APCs and densities of members per APC between regional 
groupings and member states. Lastly, the total agricultural output cooperative development 
indicator shows how agriculturally productive different countries and regions are overall.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Early Cooperatives in Europe: 
While agricultural cooperatives are seen today as another form of business 
enterprise that farmers across the globe use to aggregate and sell their goods, the ethos of 
agricultural cooperatives is found in the early history of the larger cooperative movement. 
To understand the role and varying levels of prevalence of agricultural cooperatives in the 
modern context of the European Union, it is important to examine the history and evolution 
of cooperatives in Europe. Cooperative organizations arose in direct opposition to the 
development of industrial capitalism and modernism in the eighteenth century (Fairbairn, 
2004). Advances in mechanized technology that were developed during England’s 
Industrial Revolution (1750-1850) brought an end to the widespread home-based business 
movement that existed before the Industrial Revolution. This was due to the inability of 
home-based producers to compete with the low-cost consumer goods that factories could 
provide (Center for Cooperatives, 2015).  
Workers who were displaced from these home-based operations moved into 
overcrowded cities where jobs were scarce and labor standards and wages were low while 
increased efficiency in agriculture sent more workers out of the field and into the city. As 
the working class and their allies looked for ways to fight socio-economic stratification 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, 
cooperatives were conduits for organising the average worker in opposition to the factory 
owner. The advent of cooperatives allowed factory workers to gain a new level of 
autonomy by providing a practical way for them to compete against those with much more 
money by pooling resources and participating in a cooperatively owned enterprise. 
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 “Friendly Society” organizations in England were some of the earliest iterations of 
civil society organizations that functioned similarly to cooperatives. They promoted mutual 
benefits for workers of the same trade who participated in what would be now considered 
insurance programs where each worker paid into a fund which was used to assist workers 
who were injured on the job or who fell ill and were unable to work for a period. In 1702, 
a definition for Friendly Society organizations was provided by author Daniel Defoe in his 
An Essay on Projects. Defoe explains how these friendly societies could provide a social 
safety net to help keep workers from falling into ruin due to accidents or illness. Defoe 
characterized Friendly Society organizations as, “a number of people entering into a mutual 
compact to help one another in case any disaster or distress fall upon them” (Defoe, 1702, 
p. 118). This kind of community-based insurance program is an early example of a self-
help organization that originated when business and government failed to adequately 
compensate or provide assistance to workers when they encountered hardship. 
Over 100 years later, Defoe’s vision was developed further through the work of 
William King, a doctor and educator who saw the difficulties that workers were facing at 
finding decent paying jobs in Brighton, England. In 1827, Dr. King helped to create the 
first cooperative in the history of England: The Brighton Co-operative Society, which used 
member dues of one penny per week to publish The Co-operator magazine (Simkin, 1993). 
The Co-operator was used to explain to the working class the importance of mutually 
beneficial cooperative organizations over capitalist establishments. The Co-operator 
eventually sold 12,000 copies a month and could pay fair wages to its employees as well 
as finance the work of the Brighton Co-operative Society. It did so well that the Brighton 
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Co-operative Society invested into several Brighton businesses that paid their workers 
more than the going wage of non-cooperatively managed businesses. 
In 1922, The British Co-operative Union chronicled the life and work of Dr. King 
in Dr. William King and the Co-operator, a book comprised of an introduction by William 
Mercer followed by all issues of The Co-operator that were published between 1828-1830. 
Included within the introduction is a description of the mutual-aid society founded by 
students of Dr. King called the Brighton Co-operative Benevolent Fund Association. Its 
objectives were, “first, to raise by a small weekly contribution a fund for the purpose of 
enabling proper persons (who have not themselves the means) to join Co-operative 
Communities, by giving the whole or part of the capital, as the circumstances of the 
individual may require; and, secondly, to spread a knowledge of the co-operative system” 
(King & Mercer, 1922, p. XX). The introduction notes that the main reason why Dr. King 
began self-publishing The Co-operator was to raise awareness of the associations and 
societies of his students, a goal which he indeed accomplished.  
The work of King along with early cooperative pioneers such as Robert Owen stand 
as early examples of collective action around cooperative participation in the industrial 
age. Robert Owen, often called the “Father of Socialism”, pioneered an experiment of 
mutually beneficial participation in Lanarkshire, Scotland called New Lanark which he 
owned from 1800-1825 (Williams & Thompson, 2011, p. 56). Owen provided his workers 
with free health care and free education on top of their pay, benefits which were not offered 
other industrialists in England during that time. Owen himself described the project as “the 
most important experiment for the happiness of the human race that had yet been instituted 
at any time in any part of the world” (Kumar, 1990, p. 14). The form of Utopian Socialism 
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that Owen promoted became a model for industrial production that kept in mind the needs 
of workers and provided them with amenities and benefits that were not yet the norm in 
Western industrial countries and which went against the business practices of the day 
(Dowd, 2012). The principles that pioneers such as Defoe, King, and Owen developed still 
help to inform how organizations such as the International Co-operative Alliance define 
and assist cooperatives even as they evolve into iterations that look much different than 
they did in the 18th and 19th centuries (Fairbairn, 2004).  
While cooperatives were being used in the 18th and 19th in British industrial sectors 
to protect workers against rampant capitalism, early cooperative movements in Denmark 
and Poland provided workers with the same protection against exploitation in the 
agricultural sector. The Danish cooperative agriculture movement, also called the 
Andelsbevaegelsen in Danish, became a formidable force as cooperative dairies began to 
form in 1882 (Choloupkova, Svendsen, & Svendsen, 2003, p. 248). Over the next several 
decades, cooperative movements formed in other sectors including the fodder, 
slaughterhouses, and banks, eventually becoming the de facto way to organize businesses 
in rural Denmark. These cooperative business ventures were formed by peasants who, 
before 1882, had been producing their own agricultural goods and selling them to traders, 
a process which was expensive and unpredictable. When dairies began to organize 
cooperatively in 1882, members saw immediate results in the quality, quantity, and price 
of butter that was produced cooperatively (Choloupkova et al., 2003). The social capital 
that developed in rural communities in the latter half of the 19th century remains strong 
today in the Danish cooperative dairy sector as well as in other sectors. 
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While the Danish cooperative agricultural sector remained strong throughout the 
20th century like those of its Western European neighbors, the Polish cooperative 
agricultural sector paints a dismal picture of the rise and fall of cooperative agricultural 
sectors in the CEECs. Between 1918 to 1939, the cooperative dairy sector in Poland 
flourished and plentiful cooperative banks were able to provide credit to Polish farmers 
(Choloupkova et al., 2003). By 1939, there were over 14,000 cooperative organizations in 
Poland. However, the post-World War II communist regime decimated the industrial, 
financial, and agricultural cooperative sectors in Poland and the road to recovery after 1989 
bas been littered with many challenges. According to Chloupkova et al. (2003), “private 
farms were in advance obliged to sign contracts specifying the volumes of produce they 
would sell to the state and accept the prices set by the state” (Choloupkova et al., 2003, p. 
248). This and other policies restricted voluntary cooperation, and forced cooperation made 
many farmers reluctant to work with the government during the communist regime and 
suspicious of cooperative policies after 1989. This suspicion of the state and of cooperation 
is a central theme in the cooperative agricultural legacy of other CEECs and will be 
highlighted throughout this thesis. 
 
2.2 History of Agricultural Cooperatives in the EU 
The global agricultural status quo of the post-World War II era has been oriented 
towards maintaining a stable supply of food and agricultural goods in the face of rising 
levels of consumption and increasing populations. The leaders of this new era of agriculture 
were countries such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand which all developed 
national subsidy programs to incentivize farmers to produce as much of specific kinds of 
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agricultural goods as possible (Almas & Campbell, 2012). Technological advances in the 
agricultural sciences helped to boost yields while a free trade regime that included countries 
in the developing world provided the competition and subsequent increases in productivity 
necessary to provide consumers with historically inexpensive food (Almas & Campbell, 
2012). One of the goals of this new era of globalized agricultural production and trade was 
to effectively end world hunger by providing an excess of cheap agri-food products to 
rapidly expanding populations in both developed and developing countries. The European 
model took the opportunity to implement a system that would work with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) guidelines on subsidies and tariffs while the U.S. system continued 
to utilize productivist policies that often clashed with WTO rules. 
Many European countries participated in this era of cheap food by developing the 
same kind of direct-subsidy regimes found in the United States and Australia. It was not 
until the late 1980s that the supply and demand problem of under-production moved to a 
problem of over-production (Almas & Campbell, 2012). During this time, the debate over 
agricultural production practices in Europe moved from focusing solely on hunger to 
focusing also on the environmental effects of agricultural production, animal welfare, and 
human health. In 1992, European governments began to respond to the outcry against 
direct-subsidy regimes and took steps to decouple the link between production and 
subsidies while also promoting alternative income-generating practices such as “organic 
farming, farm tourism, on- and off-farm diversification, and environmental and cultural 
landscape management” (Almas & Campbell, 2012, p. 4). In making these changes to the 
subsidy regime in the EU, policymakers were responding not only to public discourse but 
also to changes in WTO rules that sought to end direct payment and price support. These 
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neoliberal changes to the agri-food system were founded in “market competitiveness, 
comparative advantage, and improved market share”, shunning traditional models of 
“market protection, state assistance, and export promotion” (Potter & Tilzey, 2007, p. 
1293). 
The paradigm of agricultural production in the EU that formed after the WTO 
policy reforms of the early 1990s is known as “multifunctional agriculture”. 
Multifunctional agriculture incorporates a strong moral grounding in sustainable 
production that elevates maintaining environmentally and economically stable rural 
communities over potentially disruptive intensive production practices (Almas & 
Campbell, 2012). Multifunctionalism argues that agriculture has multiple functions in both 
the economic and traditionally noneconomic realms. One of the aims of the EU’s 
multifunctional model is to use agriculture to maintain “rural landscapes, protect 
biodiversity, generate employment, and contribute to the viability of rural areas” in 
addition to food production (De Master, 2012, p. 93). However, multifunctionality has been 
highly contested within international discourses on global agricultural policy with critics 
arguing that it is “an exeptionalist excuse for continued agricultural protectionism” due to 
its continued use of certain forms of subsidies (Potter & Tilzey, 2007, p. 1291).  
For others, multifunctionality is a form of resistance to continued trade 
liberalization and an important step towards incentivizing more sustainable forms of 
agricultural production and trade. In its Agenda 2000 report, the European Commission 
explained why CAP subsidies are aimed towards promoting a successful multifunctional 
agricultural model. The report said that “the fundamental difference between the European 
model and that of our main competitors lies in the multifunctional nature of agriculture in 
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Europe and the role it plays in the economy and the environment, in society, and in the 
conservation of the countryside” (De Master, 2012, p. 93).   Proponents view the principle 
of multifunctionality as a novel approach to developing a more holistic agricultural system 
that incorporates social and environmental concerns into agricultural policies. Farmers are 
envisioned as stewards of public goods, acting as custodians of rural landscapes and the 
environment. According to Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2007), the multiple functions that are 
served through multifunctional production exist in several different groups (Huylenbroeck, 
2007, p. 6). These groups include: 
• “Green functions: landscape management and the upkeep of landscape amenities, 
wildlife management, the creation of wildlife habitat and animal welfare, the 
maintenance of biodiversity, improvement of nutrient recycling and limitation of 
carbon sinks; 
• Blue services: water management, improvement of water quality, flood control, 
water harvesting and creation of (wind-) energy; 
• Yellow services: the role of farming for rural cohesion and vitality, ambience and 
development, exploiting cultural and historical heritages, creating a regional 
identity and offering hunting, agro-tourism and agro-entertainment; and 
• White functions: food security and safety”. 
 The movement of many of the countries in the European Union towards 
multifunctional agriculture also corresponds with the European tradition of cooperation, 
even as the definition of cooperation differs depending on the cultural, economic, 
historical, and political legacies of each member state. As Europe recovered from the 
devastation of World War II, cooperation was key to ensuring a peaceful and prosperous 
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future for the continent. APCs became a centerpiece in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) of the European Community because the Community wanted more integration and 
cooperation between member states concerning their individual agricultural policies 
(COGECA, 2010). The Treaty of Rome, which was signed in 1957 and established the 
CAP, gave rise to the possibility for representation and influence of farmers and farming 
experts on CAP provisions. With the support of the European Commission, the Committee 
of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) and the General Committee for 
Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union (COGECA) were formed in 1958 and 
1959 as representative organizations aimed at supporting the interests of APCs and farm 
workers at the EC level (COGECA, 2010). Today, COPA and COGECA remain the two 
largest agri-cooperative and farmer lobbying organizations in the EU. 
The inclination towards cooperative participation in Europe remained strong as the 
European Community morphed into the set of supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions that presently make up the European Union. The current macro view of how 
APCs are faring in the EU today can be observed by looking at the market share that APCs 
hold in a specific agricultural sector or across all sectors (Brusselaers, Poppe, & Azcarate, 
2014). In 2010, the average market share of APCs in the EU was around 40% across all 
agricultural sectors, with APCs in some countries achieving over 50% market share across 
all agricultural sectors (Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014). According to the 2015 COGECA 
document, COPA and COGECA currently represent 70 national farming and cooperative 
organizations at the EU level and 22,000 farmers’ cooperative organizations across the 
continent (COGECA, 2015). In 2015, Cooperatives Europe reported that the European 
Union contained over 51,392 APCs with over 9,592,704 members, 675,566 employees, 
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and over 347 € billion in annual turnover in the cooperative agricultural sector. The 
turnover in the cooperative agricultural sector was 39.34% of the total turnover from all 
sectors cooperative enterprises (Cocolino, 2016).  The Cooperatives Europe document also 
notes that from 2011 – 2012, the turnover of the top 100 performing APCs represented by 
COGECA increased by 4% and by 14% from 2012–2013. 
Although these macro statistics paint a positive picture of APCs in the EU, and 
while some member states have cooperative agricultural sectors with high shares of the 
market, the cooperative agricultural sectors of other member states are sometimes much 
less developed (Brusselaers, Poppe, & Azcarate, 2014). In 2010, while Finland, Denmark, 
Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, and Austria all had cooperative agricultural 
sectors with market shares of over 50% over eight distinct sectors, other countries had 
much lower market shares across the same sectors or only had strong percentages in a few 
sectors (Brusselaers, Poppe, & Azcarate, 2014). Based on these data, the tendency of many 
Northern and Western states to produce cooperatively is clear. However, how can we 
explain the lower market shares present is other countries, many of which are in Central 
and Eastern European member states? To tackle this question, it is important to look at the 
scholarship surrounding the Common Agricultural Policy to understand how its policy 
tools are used to support APCs. 
 
2.3 The Structure and Organization of the Common Agricultural Policy 
 The Common Agricultural Policy is itself a test of European cooperation after WTO 
rules threatened an era of unfettered trade liberalization. Since 1992 when the EU began to 
move away from market interventionist policies towards policies to foster rural 
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development and environmental sustainability, the CAP has undergone a series of policy 
reforms and adapted the tools that it uses to monitor and regulate the agricultural sector 
(Matthews, 2011). During the past twenty years, reforms to build a financial safety net for 
producers, develop environmental requirements for farmers, and foster rural development 
have changed the way in which the CAP intervenes within the agricultural sector. While 
90% of the CAP budget in 1992 was allocated towards market management by way of 
export refunds and intervention purchases of member state products, in 2013 market 
intervention had dropped to only 5% of the CAP budget, showing a clear transition away 
from an interventionist subsidy regime towards allowing the decisions of consumers to 
allow the market to set its own unsubsidized prices (European Commission, 2013).  
 The CAP is organizationally comprised of a two-pillar structure, each pillar 
maintaining specific foci and competencies regarding agriculture and rural development in 
the European Union. The first pillar, or the “common organization of the markets in 
agricultural products” (CMO), is concerned with maintaining a stable market and ensuring 
high levels of productivity across the different agricultural sectors in the EU (Ragonnaud, 
2016a). Prior to 2003, there were 21 different CMO programs that each covered specific 
agricultural products and the direct payments to farmers that were linked to production. 
The Luxembourg reform of 2003 began the process of decoupling payments from 
production and moving towards a single payment scheme that allowed farmers to produce 
what the market wanted instead of what the subsidy programs incentivized (Ragonnaud, 
2016a). After 2007, the 21 different CMO programs were combined into one singular CMO 
that supports all forms of agricultural products. These changes to the first pillar of the CAP 
moved price support intervention measures from the CAPs main form of agricultural 
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support into a safety net option used only in times of market disruption (Ragonnaud, 
2016a). Since the reforms made to the CAP in 2013, the CMO plays a much different role 
than it did prior to 2003. The current structure of the CMO has both an internal and external 
focus regarding production and trade in the EU. Internally, the CMO maintains its role in 
market intervention while also managing the rules on marketing and producer 
organizations. Externally, the CMO manages the rules regarding import and export duties, 
tariff quotas, and export refunds.  
The direct payments paid to farmers by the CMO target specific objectives that are 
outlined as followed: 1) a payment per hectare based off of national or regional criteria; 2) 
payments for “greening”, or the specific environmental public good provided by farms that 
are not accounted for in market transactions; 3) payments for five years to young farmers; 
4) “redistributive payments”; 5) income support for farmers producing in environments 
with “natural constraints”; 6) some coupled to production support based off of economic 
or social goals; 7) payments to “small farmers” (Massot, 2017). The first three of these 
objectives are mandatorily funded while the following four are optionally or partially 
funded based on the needs of each member state. The funding to pay for these direct 
payments under the first pillar of the CAP is paid out to member states who then appropriate 
the money based off their own needs. Thirty percent of funding is required to go towards 
the “greening” component while the other 70% is earmarked to fund the optional 
components (Massot, 2017). This system provides member states with flexibility in how 
they individually allocate dollars towards national and regional agricultural goals and 
objectives while providing an overall direction for agriculture in the EU with a heavy focus 
on incentivizing environmentally friendly production practices. 
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The second pillar of the CAP is known as the rural development policy. 
Implemented in 2000, the rural development policy is funded by the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) which is aimed at promoting growth and 
employment through sustainable rural development that is conscious of maintaining a 
healthy environment (Ragonnaud, 2016b). Member states work with the EAFRD on rural 
development projects based on an extensive “menu” of approved measures provided by the 
EAFRD. Rural development projects are co-developed and co-financed by member states 
and the EAFRD after a project is ascertained to support the priorities of the EAFRD and 
target a specific measure on the menu and then approved by the EC (Ragonnaud, 2016b). 
Similar to the approach that the CMO uses to allocate funding in pillar one, the process of 
deciding upon rural development projects is based on the specific needs of each member 
state. The priorities laid out by the new rural development policy are outlined on the 
website of the European Parliament as (Ragonnaud, 2016b):  
• To promote knowledge transfer and innovation in agriculture and forestry; 
• To increase the viability and competitiveness of all types of agriculture, 
promote innovative agricultural technologies and support sustainable forest 
management; 
• To promote the organization of the food production chain, animal welfare 
and risk management in farming; 
• To restore, preserve and enhance agricultural and forest ecosystems; 
• To promote the efficient use of resources and support the transition to a low-
carbon economy; and 
• To promote social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development. 
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2.4 Producer Organizations 
 The details of the Common Agricultural Policy require not only a knowledge of its 
current configuration but also a knowledge of the CAP reforms over the past two decades 
to fully understand its impact and trajectory. Understanding the way that CAP is organized 
and the ever-changing policy instruments at its disposal is necessary to build an informed 
understanding of how the policy defines and affects APCs. In the context of the CAP, 
agricultural cooperatives are legally codified as “voluntary agricultural producer 
organizations” (POs) which the European Commission has committed to support through 
the development of a policy environment that promotes POs (Brusselaers, Poppe, & 
Azcarate, 2014). A common definition of a PO is: “a rural business, owned and controlled 
by producers, and engaged in collective marketing activities… Thus, in a broad sense, POs 
are, like cooperatives, user-owned, user-controlled, and user–benefit organizations” 
(Bijman et al., 2012, p. 18).  The term “producer organization” is the way in which APCs 
are defined and codified in EU law, although there are distinct differences in how POs 
function in practice. POs deal much less with the processing of members’ products but 
instead engage in the joint marketing and sale of members’ products (Bijman et al., 2012). 
POs in the fruit and vegetable (F&V) sector are the only POs financially supported by CAP. 
EU legislation was passed to support POs in the dairy sector in 2012 and in other sectors 
in 2014, signaling that growth in the F&V sector has led to increased EU support of POs 
in other sectors (Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014).  
Prior to 2007, the prevalence of small F&V farms that lacked the capacity to 
consolidate and realize a larger production capacity was observed and noted by EU 
officials. Since the 2007 CAP reforms to the Common Market Order (CMO) which aimed 
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to support farmers who were members of POs in the F&V sector, new provisions focusing 
on supporting them yielded increases in cooperative development and participation 
(Brusselaers, Poppe, & Azcarate, 2014). Financial support of F&V POs has largely been a 
test to see if increased cooperative participation could be fostered through incentivizing 
production in specific sectors. 
One example of increased cooperative participation was in the case of Italian F&V 
POs. POs in this sector utilized a new CAP co-financing scheme that allowed the POs to 
co-finance investments with CAP funds, especially investments aimed at product 
marketing support (Brusselaers, Poppe, & Azcarate, 2014). These F&V POs performed 
much better than APCs in other sectors that were only supported by national law without 
EU financial support. In Italy, they reached a 33% market share of the overall F&V sector 
while POs in other sectors only made up 4% of the market. Additionally, reforms of CAP 
in 1996 to the F&V CMO created new subsidies which helped to spur the development of 
new POs. These reforms broadened the definition of POs which allowed POs that existed 
in various other legal forms before 1996 to access these subsidies (Brusselaers, Poppe, & 
Azcarate, 2014). 
EU legislation in 2007 that allowed EU-recognized POs to expand into the hops, 
olive oil, table olives, and silkworm sectors legally recognized farmers in these sectors with 
the express directive that these organizations should focus on: “(i) concentrating supply 
and marketing the produce of the members; (ii) adapting production jointly to the 
requirements of the market and improving the product; (iii) promoting the rationalisation 
and mechanisation of production” (Bijman et al., 2012, p. 20). Additionally, legislation in 
2012 opened the dairy sector to the concept of POs, allowing farmers to use POs to 
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collectively negotiate contract terms such as the price of raw milk. However, neither of 
these legislative changes mandate mutual ownership or democratic governance of POs as 
is outlined in EU law for POs in the F&V sector, meaning that the only POs currently 
recognized by the EU that can be classified as true APCs are those in the F&V sector 
(Bijman et al., 2012). The variation in cooperative development across the EU signals that 
while both POs and APCs flourish in some parts of the EU based on current CAP programs, 
if the EU seeks a more evenly distributed development of POs and APCs, its policies 
towards POs and APCs must take into account the varying cultural, economic, historical, 
and political legacies that exist in different member states (Bijman & Iliopoulos, 2014). 
The success of the F&V PO program indicates that expanding financial support into sectors 
that presently have less membership density and lower percentages of market shares of 
cooperatively produced goods would be beneficial to bolster sectoral cooperative 
participation. 
 
2.5 Philosophical Underpinnings and the Social Economy 
The economic advantages of risk sharing, collective bargaining, and aggregation 
realized through cooperative participation have been expounded upon already, but a strong 
philosophical argument can be made for how APCs promote rural development and 
agriculture as public goods. Karl Polanyi pioneered the idea that economic interests are not 
the only forces pushing a person to act, but instead social relationships surround a person’s 
economic interests, and these relationships drive one’s economic performance (Polanyi, 
Arensberg, & Pearson, 1957). He considers both economic and nonmarket goods as 
important, meaning that society benefits overall when nonmarket goods, goods such as 
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environmental sustainability and rural development, are invested in and protected. 
Nonmarket goods are often undervalued because these goods are characterized as abundant 
and ubiquitous. However, when there is a chance that nonmarket goods could be lost or 
harmed, production practices and market transactions evolve in ways that elevate the 
protection of nonmarket goods that are of value to society (Polanyi, Arensberg, & Pearson, 
1957). The socially embedded economy helps us to understand variations in cooperative 
participation by providing a framework for how different member states might or might 
not value specific nonmarket goods or how they might have differing mechanisms for 
protecting nonmarket goods.  
This idea that the economy should be embedded within society centers around 
reciprocity and redistribution. Polanyi believed that reciprocal acts in tribal societies 
maintained a level of social cohesion that are absent in relationships in the industrial market 
economy (Filip, 2012). Polanyi writes that, “…all social obligations are reciprocal, and 
their fulfillment serves also the individual’s give-and-take interests best. Such a situation 
must exert a continuous pressure on the individual to eliminate economic self-interest from 
his consciousness to the point of making him unable… even to comprehend the 
implications of his own actions in terms of such an interest” (Polanyi, 1945, 46). Polanyi 
argues here that social interactions depend on reciprocal transactions even if those 
transactions are not immediately visible to the parties involved. Reciprocity is often 
complemented by redistribution in Polanyi’s socially embedded economy. Redistribution 
is the spreading of wealth between the rich and the poor to help make society more secure 
overall and is in Polanyi’s view a major function and obligation of the state.  
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Polanyi believed that the industrial economy creates poverty and economic 
inequality, problems which must be remedied through redistribution. Institutions such as 
public education and job training must be protected to give the working class a fair chance. 
In analyzing Polanyi’s motives for supporting redistribution, Filip writes that, “Polanyi 
aimed to restore a moral and ethical relationship between human beings by establishing an 
institutional framework that regulates the activities of individuals” (Filip, 2012). 
Reciprocity and redistribution are integral to understanding variations in cooperative 
participation across the EU. This is because countries have different historical and 
socioeconomic legacies that affect how member states view reciprocal transactions and the 
redistribution of wealth. For instance, the stigmatization of collectivization in CEECs could 
be a contributing factor to the lower levels of cooperative development present in these 
countries. Even though the success of the F&V CMO and the success of EU dairy APCs in 
raising prices paid to farmers show that there are benefits to cooperative participation, 
perhaps the focus on individual success observed by Gijselinckx and Bussels (2014) 
provides an explanation for the stigmatization of cooperative participation. 
 Understanding the differences between the socially embedded and the market-
dominated economy also relies on an understanding of what Polanyi calls fictitious 
commodities. Fictitious commodities are elements not meant to be economically evaluated 
and traded through market transactions. In The Great Transformation, Polanyi writes, “To 
allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the 
demolition of society” (Polanyi, 1945, p. 76). The commodities that Polanyi was referring 
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to were land, labor, and capital, all things which have over time been commodified to the 
point that their intrinsic value has been questioned and threatened.  
There is a limit to how much a system can commodify land and human labor before 
the system itself implodes, examples of such times being the Great Depression and the 
Great Recession in the US context. The website OnTheCommons.org published an article 
at the beginning of 2009 shortly after the beginning of the Great Recession with title “Why 
Karl Polanyi Still Matters” offers a glimpse into the arguments that it makes regarding 
fictitious commodities in the 21st century (Bollier, 2009). An excerpt from the article reads, 
“The big cultural project of our time is learning to accept the reality that nature has its own 
needs and limits, that human beings are not fungible units of labor, and that even money is 
a social creation based on social trust and governance” (Bollier, 2009, 1). Polanyi’s work 
on fictitious commodities is a reminder that humankind and nature both have limits and 
that treating land and labor as expendable is not the way to organize a sustainable economic 
system. The democratic and mutually beneficial nature of APCs makes them ideal for 
utilizing Polanyian reciprocity and redistribution to re-embed markets back into society. 
Polanyian reciprocity is found in APCs because producers realize greater benefits through 
cooperation than without cooperation.  
Polanyi’s concept of “double movement” argues that attempts of self-protection 
transform societies in very different ways. Double movement is the idea that as self-
regulating, free markets continue to dominate, those who feel the negative effects of market 
failures or of structural economic transitions will resist and form alternative economic 
models to embed social considerations back into the economy (Maertens, 2008). These 
counter movements are bred out of protectionist pressure to give national governments 
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more control over their labor force and economies than is accessible under international 
free trade regimes. These movements range from fascist totalitarianism (Nazi Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy) that promote top-down control to bottom-up, socialist leaning 
movements that promote democracy and social development as alternatives to the 
disruptive effects of the unfettered free market. It could be argued that the democratic, 
mutually beneficial nature of APCs represents the latter movement. 
 
2.6 Hypothesis 
Drawing on insights from the literature review, the following hypotheses were 
tested using national-level data and making regional comparisons:  
- The different historical and socioeconomic legacies of Northern and Western 
European, Central and Eastern European, and Southern and Mediterranean European 
member states have an effect on the level of cooperative participation as measured by 
cooperative development indicators. 
- The degree to which the historical and socioeconomic legacies of each regional 
grouping affect their level of cooperative participation will be reflected in the density 
of APC membership, with higher density reflecting higher levels of cooperative 
participation and lower density reflecting lower levels of cooperative participation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
To discern which indicators are correlated with the level of participation in APCs 
in the European Union, this thesis largely relies on analyzing patterns of cooperative 
development across groups of countries. Three groups of member states were identified as 
having comparable historical and political backgrounds and varying levels of cooperative 
development. The three groups of member states are: Northern and Western European, 
Central and Eastern European, and Mediterranean and Southern European. To quantify the 
level of cooperative development between groups, variables were chosen that reveal how 
groups or individual countries compares against one another. These cooperative 
development variables include APCs per capita, average members per APC, APC members 
per capita, and average agricultural output.  
 The APCs per capita variable was calculated using David Grace and Associates 
(2014) population figures for each member state and COGECA (2015) figures on the 
number of agricultural cooperatives in each member state. Agricultural cooperatives in the 
COGECA study are treated as synonymous with APCs in this thesis and therefore the 
number of agricultural cooperatives is treated as the number of APCs. This decision was 
made because the COGECA study uses a similar definition for cooperatives as the 
definition for APCs. The COGECA definition reads: “Cooperatives are the extension of 
the farming activity, as they enable farms to increase their bargaining power, which is 
essential to reduce cost when supplying inputs and material” (COGECA, 2015, p. 15). 
Average members per PC was calculated using aggregated membership data for each 
member state from Cooperatives Europe (2015), David Grace and Associates (2014), and 
COGECA (2015) figures on the number of agricultural cooperatives in each member state. 
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APC members per capita was calculated using aggregated membership data for each 
member state from Cocolina (2016), David Grace and Associates (2014), and COGECA 
(2015) population figures for each member state. Average agricultural output was 
calculated using an average of EUROSTAT (2013-2016) data on the total output of the 
agricultural industry in millions of euros over three years for each member state. 
 Using SPSS 26 for data management and analysis, each cooperative development 
indicator was analyzed to find the median, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum for all member states.  Additionally, member states were coded as 1, 2, or 3 into 
one of the three groups: 1 if the member state is Northern and Western European, 2 if the 
member state is Central and Eastern European, or 3 if the member state is Mediterranean 
and Southern European. Member states were then coded into a “low”, “medium”, or “high” 
categories for each indicator, “low” representing the lowest 33.33%, “medium” 
representing the middle 33.33%, and “high” representing the highest 33.33%. Once these 
groups were created, a crosstabulation was conducted to see how many members of each 
group of countries fall into the “low”, “medium”, and “high” categories for each of the 
cooperative development indicators. Comparing column percentages, this analysis was 
undertaken to see if any specific patterns in cooperative development exist between groups 
of countries which have specific historical and socioeconomic linkages that were identified 
in the literature.  
 This thesis also uses lambda and the uncertainty coefficient to measure the effect, 
size, or degree of association between indicators. Lambda incorporates the proportional 
reduction error when considering the independent variable to predict the dependent 
variables, with 0 indicating that there is no association and 1 indicating that the independent 
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variable predicts the dependent variable (Loether & McTavish, 1993). The uncertainty 
coefficient shows “the proportional reduction in error when values of one variable are used 
to predict values of the other variable” (IBM, 2017). The uncertainty coefficient shows 
how much knowledge of an indicator reduces the error in predicting another indicator. The 
p-values for lambda and the uncertainty coefficient show the level of statistical significance 
for each association, with p < .10 indicating a statistically significant association (Loether 
& McTavish, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
 Before considering the findings of how cooperative development indicators varies 
between country groups, it is useful to explore the descriptive statistics for all EU member 
states for comparison (Table 1). Complete data are here available for average agricultural 
output and APCs per capita, however for both APC members per capita and average 
members per APC, only 23 member states had usable data available. Average agricultural 
output measures the average total output of the agricultural industry in millions of euros 
over three years for each member state. Member states range from a minimum of 128 to a 
maximum of 75,318 with a standard deviation of 19,833.88. The mean for average 
agricultural output is 14,982.86 and the median is 6,885.50. APCs per capita across 
member states is at its minimum .32 and at its maximum 17.88 with a standard deviation 
of 5.15. The mean for APCs per capita is 5.44 and the median is 3.29. APC members per 
capita across member states is at its minimum 4.98 and at its maximum 4,395.14 with a 
standard deviation of 1,229.39. The mean for APC members per capita is 1,286.39 and the 
median is 834.94. Lastly, average members per APC across member states is at its 
minimum 1 and at its maximum 5,345 with a standard deviation of 1,532.08. The mean for 
APC members per capita is 1,027.96 and the median is 307. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for European Union Member States 
 
 Average 
Agricultural 
Output 
APCs per Capita APC Members per 
Capita 
Average Members 
per APC 
Total Countries 28 28 23 23 
Mean 14982.86 5.44 1286.39 1027.96 
Median 6885.50 3.29 834.94 307.00 
Std. Deviation 19833.88 5.15 1229.39 1532.08 
Minimum 128.00 .32 4.99 1 
Maximum 75318.00 17.88 4395.14 5345 
Sources: Cooperatives Europe (2015), David Grace and Associates (2014), EUROSTAT (2013-2016), and 
COGECA (2015). Additional calculations by author.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 demonstrate the wide range of variation present 
between member states for each cooperative development indicator. This information is 
useful when comparing a group of member states against the whole of the EU regarding 
the cooperative development indicators. However, crosstabulations are more useful for the 
purposes of this thesis because they allow for a comparison of different groups against one 
another and not only against all EU member states. The crosstabulations below demonstrate 
for these member state group comparisons within the “low”, “medium”, and “high” 
categories for each cooperative development variable as was explained in the “Methods 
and Analysis” section above. 
 Although the focus of this study is between region comparisons, it is important to 
summarize the within region variation that exists between regional groupings. Augmenting 
Table 1, Table 8 in the appendix demonstrates that across all regional groupings, there is 
variation in members per APC and APCs per capita, signaling that within each region, 
member states engage in cooperative participation in the agricultural sector to varying 
degrees. For instance, while there are 358 members per APC in France, there are 4879 
members per APC in Finland. Coupled with the fact that Finland produces only about one-
sixteenth of France’s average agricultural output, this variation in members per APC could 
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mean that there is a larger focus on cooperative production in Finland or that members in 
France are more consolidated with larger levels of production per member. When it comes 
to APCs per capita, Central and Eastern European member states range from .32 APCs per 
capita in Romania to 14.37 APCs per capita in Croatia. These data signal that further 
studies on interregional variation in cooperative participation is the next logical step to 
understanding cooperative variation in the EU.  
Table 2: Agricultural Producers Cooperatives Per Capita  
in European Union Member States 
 
Category Northern and 
Western 
European 
Central and 
Eastern 
European 
Mediterranean 
and Southern 
European 
Total 
Low 45.5% 
(5) 
27.3%  
(3) 
0.0%  
(0) 
30.8%  
(8) 
Medium 45.5%  
(5) 
18.2%  
(2) 
50.0%  
(2) 
34.6%  
 (9)  
High 9.1%  
(1) 
54.5%  
(6) 
50.0%  
(2) 
34.6%  
(9) 
Total 
(n) 
100.0%  
(11) 
100.0%  
(11) 
100.0%  
(4) 
100.0%  
(26) 
Sources: David Grace and Associates (2014) and COGECA (2015). Additional 
calculations by author. 
 
In analyzing tables 2 through 4, patterns can be identified between the different 
regional groups and the cooperative development indicators. For instance, table 2 indicates 
that 45.5% of Northern and Western European member states are in the “low” category for 
APCs per capita while 54.5% of the Central and Eastern European member states are in 
the “high” category for the same cooperative development indicator. Additionally, half of 
the Mediterranean and Southern European member states are in the “medium” category 
and half are in the “high” category for APCs per capita. This means that there is a higher 
density of APCs in CEECs than in Northern and Western member states and that 
Mediterranean and Southern European member states tend to also have a higher density of 
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APCs. While historical data on APCs per capita over time is not available, the rise in APCs 
per capita in CEECs could indicate an increase in cooperative participation within CEECs. 
However, the size of each APC is important because some APCs could have very low 
membership, meaning that a high number of APCs per capita is not necessarily linked to a 
higher average membership per APC. 
Table 3: Average Members per Agricultural Producers Cooperative  
in European Union Member States 
 
Category Northern and 
Western 
European 
Central and 
Eastern 
European 
Mediterranean 
and Southern 
European 
Total 
Low 0.0%  
(0) 
77.8%  
(7) 
33.3%  
(1) 
38.1%  
(8) 
Medium 44.4%  
(4) 
11.1%  
(1) 
66.7%  
(2) 
33.3%  
(7) 
High 55.6%  
(5) 
11.1%  
(1) 
0.0%  
(0) 
28.6%  
(6) 
Total 
(n) 
100.0%  
(9) 
100.0%  
(9) 
100.0%  
(3) 
100.0%  
(21) 
Sources: Cooperatives Europe (2015), David Grace and Associates (2014), and COGECA 
(2015). Additional calculations by author.  
 
 Table 3 helps to fill this knowledge gap by providing information on the average 
membership density per APC, this being an important cooperative development indicator 
because it shows how many producers use each APC to aggregate and market their product. 
Table 3 shows that 44.4% of Northern and Western European member states fall into the 
“medium” category and 55.6% fall into the “high” category while 77.8% of CEECs fell 
into the “low” category, indicating that Northern and Western member states tend to have 
higher density APCs than in CEECs. Table 2 and table 3 together indicate that Northern 
and Western European Countries have developed APCs that are larger with more 
membership per APC than in CEECs and in Mediterranean and Southern European 
countries but which are less numerous per capita than in the other regional groups. 
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Table 4: Agricultural Producers Cooperative Members per Capita  
in European Union Member States 
 
Category Northern and 
Western 
European 
Central and 
Eastern 
European 
Mediterranean 
and Southern 
European 
Total 
Low 20.0% 
(2) 
45.5%  
(5) 
50.0%  
(2) 
36.0%  
(9) 
Medium 30.0%  
(3) 
45.5%  
(5) 
0.0%  
(0) 
32.0%  
(8) 
High 50.0%  
(5) 
9.1%  
(1) 
50.0%  
(2) 
32.0%  
(8) 
Total 
(n) 
100.0%  
(10) 
100.0%  
(11) 
100.0%  
(4) 
100.0%  
(25) 
Sources: Cooperatives Europe (2015), David Grace and Associates (2014), and COGECA 
(2015). Additional calculations by author.  
 Table 4 demonstrates the APC members per capita which provides insight into how 
each regional grouping does against one another regarding density of APC members. Half 
of all Northern and Western European countries fall into the “high” category, but 30% also 
fall into the “medium” category and 20% fall into the “low” category, showing a wide 
spread APC membership density across this regional grouping. Ninety-one percent of all 
CEECs fall into the “low” and “medium” categories, revealing that many CEECs have low-
to-medium levels of participation when it comes to cooperative participation. This table 
indicates that while most Northern and Western European member states are on the 
medium-to-high end of APC member density, CEECs are on the medium-to-low end. 
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Table 5: Average Agricultural Output in European Union Member States 
 
Category Northern and 
Western 
European 
Central and 
Eastern 
European 
Mediterranean 
and Southern 
European 
Total 
Low 9.1% 
(1) 
54.5%  
(6) 
0.0%  
(0) 
26.9%  
(7) 
Medium 45.5%  
(5) 
27.3%  
(3) 
50.0%  
(2) 
38.5%  
(10) 
High 45.5%  
(5) 
18.2%  
(2) 
50.0%  
(2) 
34.6%  
(9) 
Total 
(n) 
100.0%  
(11) 
100.0%  
(11) 
100.0%  
(4) 
100.0%  
(26) 
Source: EUROSTAT (2005-2016). Additional calculations by author. 
 The average agricultural output table does not necessarily provide insight into how 
regional groupings compare against one another in regards to cooperative development. 
However, it does provide context into how different groups compare against one another 
when it comes to overall agricultural development and production. Greater amounts of total 
agricultural production could be the result of more highly developed systems of agricultural 
production than in member states with lower levels of total agricultural production.  
Table 6: Association Between Region and Cooperative Development Indicators 
 
Indicators of Cooperative 
Development 
Lambda 
(p) 
U 
(p) 
APCs per Capita .235 
p = .337 
.159 
p = .060 
Average Members per APC .462 
p = .017 
.379 
p = .002 
APC Members per Capita .188 
p = .244 
.149 
p = .086 
Average Agricultural Output .383 
p = .106 
.152 
p = .073 
  
  Table 6 contains two measures of the strength of association, lambda and the 
uncertainty coefficient, which both measure the degree of association between nominal 
variables. The lambda coefficient for the association between region and average members 
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per APC is .462, representing a strong association between region and average members 
per APC. This association reflects the variation in average membership per APC between 
regional groupings and suggests that region plays a role in the density of average members 
per APC. The p-value for the lambda measure of average members per APC is .017 which 
meets the p < .10 bar for statistical significance. The uncertainty coefficient for average 
members per APC is .379, meaning that knowledge of region helps to reduce errors in the 
prediction of the values of average members per APC by 38%. The p-value for the 
uncertainty coefficient measure of the relationship between region and average members 
per APC is .002, making the test statistically significant and further strengthening the case 
for region as an indicator of membership density.  
The association between region and average agricultural output is strong in the 
lambda measure and weak to moderate under the uncertainty coefficient measure. The 
lambda coefficient is .383 for average agricultural output, showing a moderate to strong 
association between region and average agricultural output. The weak to moderate 
association between region and average agricultural output signals that region has 
somewhat of a potential influence on the average agricultural output of member states. 
Table 7: Association Between Output and Cooperative Development Indicators 
 
 APCs per Capita Average Members per 
APC 
APC Members per 
Capita 
 Lambda 
(p) 
U 
(p) 
Lambda 
(p) 
U 
(p) 
Lambda 
(p) 
U 
(p) 
Average Agricultural 
Output 
.333 
p = .092 
.108 
p = .157 
.467 
p = .034 
.292 
p = .005 
.222 
p = .085 
.101 
p = .119 
 
 Table 7 also uses the lambda and uncertainty coefficient to test the strength of 
association between variables. It shows the strength of relationship between average 
agricultural output and the three other cooperative development indicators, APCs per 
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capita, average members per APC, and APC members per capita. The association between 
average agricultural output and average members per APC in the lambda test is strong with 
a coefficient of .467. The p-value for lambda is .034 which also meets the p < .10 test for 
statistical significance. The uncertainty coefficient of .292, meaning that knowledge of 
average agricultural output helps to reduce errors in predicting the values of average 
members per APC helps reduce uncertainty in predicting agricultural output by 29%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 The findings shown in Chapter Four suggest that out of the four cooperative 
development indicators comparing column percents and using the lambda measure, the 
association between region and average members per APC is moderate to strong and the 
association between region and average agricultural output is moderate. This indicates that 
the variations in membership density between regional groupings can be at least partially 
attributed to region when it comes to average members per APC and average agricultural 
output. However, the other two cooperative development indicators show weaker 
associations with region. The uncertainty coefficient values for table 6 are all statistically 
significant, however all the associations are weak to moderate besides that association 
between region and average members per APC where a strong association is present. This 
reveals not only that region is strongly associated with membership density of APCs in the 
EU, but also that knowledge of region helps to predict the values of average members per 
APC. Table 7 indicates that for lambda, a strong association exists between average 
agricultural output and average members per APC, with the uncertainty coefficient 
signaling that knowledge of average agricultural output helps to predict the values of 
average members. 
These findings do not support the first hypothesis concerning variation across all 
cooperative development indicators because the higher numbers of APCs per capita and 
APC members per capita in CEECs and Mediterranean and Southern European member 
states indicate that variation in these areas is not consistent with the suspicion of 
cooperation that has been present in these groupings for generations. However, these 
findings support the second hypothesis which states that the density of APC membership 
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affects the level of cooperative participation because patterns in the crosstabulation and the 
lambda value for the association between region and members per APC indicate a strong 
relationship. While CEECs and Mediterranean and Southern European member states 
show higher density than Northern and Western European member states in the realm of 
APCs per capita, Northern and Western European member states show higher membership 
density per APC than either of the other groupings. This indicates that APCs in Northern 
and Western European member states are larger and denser than either of other regional 
groupings.  
This thesis adds to the literature on variations of cooperative development by 
providing a quantitatively based snapshot of variation in cooperative development to 
complement existing literature on historically determinant explanations for variation in 
Chloupkova et al. (2003), Gijselinckx and Bussels (2014), Hagedorn (2014), Bijman et al. 
(2012), and Lissowska (2012).  The associations identified between region and cooperative 
development indicators and the associations between average agricultural output and the 
other cooperative development indicators pave the way for more research on associations 
between cooperative development variables and region. Additionally, this thesis connects 
the literature of Polanyi and his ideas on the socially embedded economy with 
contemporary developments in cooperative agricultural participation. By placing Polanyi’s 
ideas on the nature of economic and social transactions into a modern context, this thesis 
attempts to link widespread use of cooperative organizations in the EU to his theories on 
reciprocity, redistribution, and fictitious commodities. 
Above all else, this thesis revealed that economic cooperation in the agricultural 
sector looks different depending on national and regional context in the EU. The variations 
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identified between regional groupings in the areas of average members per APC and 
average agricultural output signal not only that regional variations exist, but also that inter-
regional variations exist. The successful financial incentivization for F&V POs by the CAP 
makes evident that expanding financially incentivized PO programs to other sectors could 
be beneficial to increased cooperative participation. However, barriers to cooperative 
participation in post-Soviet, post-Yugoslavic, and transition member states such as low 
levels of trust, difficulties protecting farmers’ incomes, and the “propaganda of individual 
success” outlined in Gijselinckx and Bussels (2014), Lissowska (2012), and Iliopoulos and 
Valentinov (2012) could also stand in the way of further cooperative participation, 
especially in CEECs. 
National data on output per APC would be useful in future studies because the data 
used in this study do not provide insight into the level of production per APC or the level 
of production by all APCs in each member state. While the perspective of this study 
focused on member states in the European Union, the same methodology could be used in 
other international and global contexts by grouping nations together with similar historical 
or socioeconomic legacies to examine levels of cooperative development and participation. 
An analysis between countries in each region would be an interesting start for further 
research. Additionally, larger numbers of countries per regional grouping would make it 
easier for the researcher to come to definitive conclusions with more statistical relevance 
in further studies. Using additional cooperative development indicators alongside those 
identified and analyzed here would also be prudent, especially if different national or 
regional contexts necessitated the inclusion of these indicators due to their situation. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 8: Summary of Cooperative Development Variables by Country and Region 
 
Region 
 
Country 
Name 
 
Members 
per APC 
 
APC 
Members 
per Capita 
 
 
APCs per 
Capita 
 
 
Average 
Agricultural 
Output1 
 NWE2 Austria 1412 1411.52 2.56 7054 
NWE Belgium - - 2.70 8512 
NWE Denmark 1633 817.64 0.50 11270 
NWE Finland 4879 3154.17 0.65 4777 
NWE France 358 1306.00 3.65 75318 
NWE Germany 600 1759.19 2.93 56172 
NWE Ireland 2689 4395.14 1.63 7267 
NWE Luxembourg - - 10.35 430 
NWE Netherlands 651 834.94 1.28 27379 
NWE Sweden 5345 1684.95 0.32 6315 
NWE United Kingdom 690 218.29 0.32 30524 
 CEEC3 Bulgaria 170 2099.52 12.32 4373 
CEEC Croatia 18 251.56 14.37 2532 
CEEC Cyprus 1780 2207.01 1.24 693 
CEEC Czech Republic 1 4.98 5.21 4924 
CEEC Estonia 97 152.01 1.57 907 
CEEC Hungary 28 317.22 11.22 7755 
CEEC Latvia - - 2.42 1305 
CEEC Lithuania 32 432.09 13.47 2878 
CEEC Malta 101 433.83 4.30 128 
CEEC Poland 2637 930.55 0.35 23301 
CEEC Romania - - 0.32 16312 
CEEC Slovakia 9 104.51 11.035 2399 
CEEC Slovenia 45 803.59 17.88 1179 
 SME4 Greece - - 4.88 10412 
SME Italy 148 1417.19 9.58 55349 
SME Portugal 13 91.35 6.98 6717 
SME Spain 307 2551.65 8.32 43338 
Source: EUROSTAT (2013-2016). Additional calculations by author. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Millions of euros, average of years 2012 –  2014 
2 Northern and Western European 
3 Central and Eastern European 
4 Southern and Mediterranean European 
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